This is an analysis of when the Miranda warning must be given. It appeared on the newsgroup alt.law-enforcement. The author is Doctor Carl Franklin.

From: "Carl Franklin" carlf@dustdevil.com

Newsgroups: alt.law-enforcement

Subject: Miranda and Stansbury Case: An Analysis

Date: Sat, 31 Jan 1998 14:30:40 -0600

Organization: none

Lines: 220

Recently we've discussed the issue of reading the Miranda Warnings to person not in custody. I suggested that such practice was a good idea, and there has been some debate on whether it was "required." DataRat caught me on a statement I made concerning such practice. I suggested that Miranda may be required when the person is the "focus" of an investigation. However, I've done some further research and will offer the following (long) analysis for your comments (or flames).

In looking at the idea of interrogation and when the Miranda warnings must be given we have to establish several important points. First, under the holding in Duckworth v. Eagan (1989) an officer does not have to give the warning verbatim. In other words, while many officers do rely on a printed card containing the warnings it is not necessary that the officer in fact read the card word for word. What is required, under Duckworth, is that the officer give reasonable notice of the rights emphasized through Miranda. As most of us know, these rights include certain protections under the 5th and 6th amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

As stated in Anderson v. State (1969), the question is "whether the words used by the officer, in view of the age, intelligence, and demeanor of the individual being interrogated, convey a clear understanding of all Miranda rights." Thus, the reading of the warning from a printed card is one way to insure that the warnings are given, but not the only way. Of course, reading from the card is one method of insuring that the rights will be given in the same manner at both the time of the questioning and then again later when questions about a proper warning are raised by the defendant. Additionally, by using a printed card or other printed device (such as a "waiver sheet" with the warnings printed on it and a place for the defendant to acknowledge he understands the rights) an officer can help avoid later issues when a defendant decides that he shouldn’t have confessed.

A larger question has presented itself, though. That is: Must an officer give the Miranda warning at times other than during the traditional "custodial interrogation" found in the Miranda case. In answering that question in an earlier post I suggested that "yes" there are times, other than in the police station, when an officer is required to give the warnings. Questions were raised about this area, and I’ve done a little more exploring. The following is what I’ve found.

In the case of Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) the court suggested that there may be times, other than during an interrogation in the jail or police station, when Miranda should be given. Specifically the court said:

"Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime."

This language, as some argue, suggests that the warnings found in Miranda extend beyond the traditional custodial interrogation. It is especially noteworthy when one considers the language chosen by the court. The word "interview" is used rather than interrogation. Also, it has been argued that the term "may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged" indicates that the "interview" may be a pre-arrest condition. It can certainly be argued that it is a pre-charging condition since the language indicates such status.

Of course, the case also suggests that the police "are not required to administer the Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question." The question is whether the person is in custody or in some other situation that may be considered "coercive" by nature. As such, we can certainly agree that a person has been arrested fits within this "coercive" situation; but what about the person who is not yet arrested.

Basically, Mathiason suggests that only when a person is in fact "restrained" from leaving will Miranda be required. Does this mean that they have to be in handcuffs or in the jail? Not really. To better understand this let’s look at a case I had cited in an earlier post.

The Stansbury Case

The most recent case dealing with such an issue is Stansbury v. California. This case, decided in 1994, involved the abduction, sexual molestation, and murder of a young California girl. The girl disappeared one autumn afternoon in the Los Angeles area of southern California. Early the next morning a witness saw a large man, who was driving a turquoise American automobile, stop near a flood control channel and throw something into the ditch. The witness summoned police who discovered the body of the missing girl. There was evidence that she had been raped, and the cause of death was determined to be asphyxia complicated by blunt force trauma to the head.

During the investigation into the murder local police discovered that the girl had been seen by two ice cream truck drivers in the area. For reasons undisclosed in the opinion the police focused on only one of the drivers. Police interrogated the driver at the police station. The other driver, Stansbury, was considered to be nothing more than a potential witness. Stansbury was eventually contacted and asked if he would voluntarily meet with officers at the police station for an interview.

During the interview two police officers were present. One of the officers, a lieutenant with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, directed the interview. Neither officer read Stansbury his rights as set forth in Miranda. Later the officers testified that at the time of the interview Stansbury was not under arrest and was not a suspect. Even though they questioned him as to his whereabouts and actions on the afternoon of the disappearance the officers didn’t consider Stansbury a suspect.

Stansbury told the officers (among other things) that on the evening of the abduction he spoke with the victim at about 6:00, returned to his trailer home after work at 9:00, and left the trailer at about midnight in his housemate's turquoise, American made car. This last detail aroused suspicions, as the turquoise car matched the description of the one the witness had observed in Pasadena. When Stansbury, in response to a further question, admitted to prior convictions for rape, kidnapping and child molestation, the lieutenant in charge of the interrogation terminated the interview and another officer advised Stansbury of his Miranda rights.

It is important to first note that Stansbury was not a suspect. He was also not in custody at the time he made the statements about the car. In fact, after he was advised of his rights he chose not to make further statements and effectively terminated the interview.

Stansbury was charged with the crimes. Before trial Stansbury filed a motion to suppress all statements made at the station, and the evidence discovered as a result of those statements. The trial court denied the motion in relevant part, ruling that Stansbury was not "in custody" -- and thus not entitled to Miranda warnings. The court held that it was only when he mentioned that he had taken his housemate's turquoise car for a midnight drive that he may have been entitled to the protections set forth by Miranda. Before that stage of the interview, the trial court reasoned, "the focus in [Lieutenant Johnston's] mind certainly was on the other ice cream [truck] driver." Only "after Mr. Stansbury made the comment . . . describing the . . . turquoise colored automobile" did Johnston's suspicions "shift to Mr. Stansbury."

Stansbury was convicted and appealed. The California Supreme Court affirmed. Before determining whether Stansbury was in custody during the interview at the station, the court set out what it viewed as the applicable legal standard:

"In deciding the custody issue, the totality of the circumstances is relevant, and no one factor is dispositive. However, the most important considerations include (1) the site of the interrogation, (2) whether the investigation has focused on the subject, (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest are present, and (4) the length and form of questioning." 4 Cal. 4th 1017, 1050, 846 P. 2d 756, 775 (1993)(internal quotation marks omitted).

Stansbury appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.

In its opinion the Supreme Court clearly re-establishes the requirements of Miranda when it stated:

"We held in Miranda that a person questioned by law enforcement officers after being "taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way" must first "be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 444 (1966).

The Court reiterated that statements elicited in noncompliance with this rule may not be admitted for certain purposes in a criminal trial. Compare id., at 492, 494; see also, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).

The Court also restated that an officer's obligation to administer Miranda warnings attaches, however, "only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him `in custody.' " Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam); see also Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990).

In determining whether an individual was in custody, a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but "the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a `formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam) (quoting Mathiason, supra, at 495).

The Court also clarified that Miranda does not necessarily extend to a person who is a suspect but not in custody. See, Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976). Likewise, an officer is not required to provide the Miranda warnings on a traffic stop even though the person being stopped is in fact in custody for the purpose of citing them for the violation. See, Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).

Frankly, in reviewing the decisions since Miranda one can clearly see the pendulum of the court swing from one side (protection of due process rights) to the other (enforcement of criminal law in an aggressive manner). As mentioned in other posts I’d say that the court of the late 1960s and early 1970s emphasized the due process model of crime control. That is, require police to follow strict guidelines in order to protect the individual freedoms of the populace even if it means letting a few "guilty" parties go. Today, under the Rehnquist court, we see a bit of a shift back to the "pro law enforcement" side of the scale. Police actions are less structured and the rules are relaxed somewhat in favor of a more aggressive (and hopefully more effective) crime control model.

Comments?

Dr. Carl Franklin

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